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U.S-C U B A
R E L A T I O N S
i n  t h e  2 1 s t  c e n t u r y
S o r a y a  M .  C a s t r o  M a r i n o
C E S E U ,  U n i v e r s i d a d  d e  L a  H a b a n a
The logic of the U.S. War on Terror permeates the current debate in both Cuba and the United States over the relationship between the two countries. Key questions in an 
analysis of the relationship hover around which of the post- 
September 11 variables are the most important in identifying 
future bilateral possibilities between Cuba and the United States. 
Of course, a full analytical model attempting to explain 
Cuban-U.S. relations must take into account external and 
domestic factors, and the relevant actors in both nations who 
have contributed to making the relationship into a 
confrontational one. The aim here is more limited. This paper 
will focus on the context in which the two States relate to each 
other today.
A relevant factor to this reflection concerns the formation of 
the Cuban State under U.S. intervention and occupation, and the 
reinforcement of Cuban nationhood with a Constitution that 
provided for a Damocles’ sword: the Platt Amendment. Under 
the assumption that Cubans were not capable of running their 
own government, the United States required that the Platt 
Amendment be included in the Constitution of the young 
Republic in return for granting Cuba its nominal freedom. The 
Platt Amendment granted to the United States the unlimited 
right to intervene in Cuban internal affairs. This left an imprint 
on Cuba’s national consciousness and a vision of the United 
States: no matter the circumstances, the potent neighbor always 
would be a cardinal power which Cubans had to take into 
consideration in creating any national design.
In structural terms, the above reflection unveils the roots 
and nature of the Cuban-U.S. conflict, sovereignty vs. 
domination, which existed even before the 1898 U.S. intervention 
into Cuba’s war of independence. While Cuban visionaries spoke 
of independence around the time of the 1823 Monroe Doctrine, 
the idea of annexing Cuba enjoyed political support in the United 
States. Indeed John Quincy Adams compared Cuba to an apple, 
saying the island would gravitate naturally to the United States 
just as "ripe fruit" has no choice but to fall to the ground. U.S. 
leaders already thought of Cuba as an extension of U.S. territory.1
Present Cuba-U.S. relations embody a similar conflict of 
national goals. Cuba has asserted that its sovereignty is a goal of 
the highest priority, and it has labored vigilantly to safeguard its 
independence from external domination. Meanwhile, the United 
States has defined its national interests in accord with the claim 
that it has the undisputed right to dominate the affairs of all 
Latin America countries. This dichotomy—sovereignty vs. 
domination—explains the continuity of a policy of punishment 
and hostility against Cuba which the U.S. government has 
pursued despite the end of the so-called Cold War.
While the East-West conflict might seem like an appropriate 
framework for reviewing these hostile relations, it actually 
obscures the essential Cuban-U.S. conflict since 1959: Cuba’s 
pursuit of sovereignty vs. the U.S. pursuit of domination. Still 
Cold War ideology did provide the language and rationale for 
U.S. policy. Thus when the Cold War ended, and the Soviet 
Union collapsed, it seemed as if a thaw in Cuban-U.S relations
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could be possible, because a substantially new international 
context existed.
C U B A  P O L IC Y  I N  T H E  C O N T E X T  O F  
T H E  W A R  A G A IN S T  T E R R O R IS M
The world system went through a transitional stage of about ten 
years, as U.S. political and military leadership acted in a unipolar 
manner and attempted to play a hegemonic international role, 
which reached a pinnacle following the September 11th terrorist 
attacks. The slogan of a “global war on terrorism” and its 
conceptualization filled the vacuum created when the prior 
“enemy” disappeared with the disintegration of the Soviet Union.
The terrorist events and the consequent tragedy in human, 
material, and political terms of September 11, 2001 constituted 
unprecedented events in U.S. history. Without doubt, the attacks 
were a wake-up call that resulted in a re-evaluation of the 
concepts and priorities of U.S. foreign and security policy.
Despite the end of the Cold War, the new policies flowing from 
the events of September 11 maintained laws and practices from 
the Cold War period. The attacks have had a direct impact on all 
U.S. domestic, foreign, and security policies, and ultimately they 
will have contributed to a total restructuring of the entire 
international relations system.
With its new “crusade against terrorism,” the Bush 
Administration revived a 1982 classification of states in terms of 
whether they are alleged “sponsors of international terrorism.” 
Notably, in 2001 Afghanistan was not listed as such a state. But 
Cuba is a target of this campaign now in part because it is on the 
list. Counter-evidence about Cuba’s behavior falls on deaf ears in 
the Bush Administration.
To link Cuba with international terrorism on the basis of 
easily discredited information, weakens the U.S. effort when 
confronting real terrorist threats.2 These claims also trivialize the 
credibility of the U.S. war on terrorism, and obscure legitimate 
concerns which the United States and Cuba ought to investigate 
bilaterally.
The events of September 11 engendered a new evaluation of 
U.S. diplomatic ties to all countries. However, the four-decades- 
old tumultuous relations between Washington and Havana 
remained stubbornly unchanged in part because of the terrorist 
attacks. For example, U.S. unilateral economic sanctions against 
Cuba, such as the restrictions on the sale of medicine and food to 
the island, have been justified on the basis of Cuba’s inclusion on 
the list of states sponsoring terrorism. U.S. officials such as James 
Cason, former chief of mission at the U.S. Interests Section in 
Havana, must believe that repetition of a lie will lead the public 
ultimately to accept its validity. He has argued erroneously that 
Cuba “missed the opportunity to join the international coalition 
against terrorism,” which, he says, “will further isolate Cuba and 
solidify its status as a rogue state.3
In reality, the Cuban government officially condemned the 
terrorist attacks on the afternoon of September 11, 2001.4 It then 
offered to provide the United States with all the medical and 
humanitarian aid it could muster, and the use of Cuban airspace 
for U.S. aircraft.5 (The U.S. Federal Aviation Administration, for 
reasons of national security, closed U.S. airspace shortly after the 
attacks.) On September 15, the Cuban government organized a 
rally of thousands of persons to condemn the attacks and show 
support for the U.S. people.6 This was followed on September 22 
by President Fidel Castro’s categorical condemnation of terrorism 
as an “ethically indefensible phenomenon that should be 
eliminated.” He also declared that Cuba was ready to “cooperate
with all the other countries in its total elimination” and added 
“Cuba would never permit its territory to be used for this type of 
action against the U.S. people.”7 He underscored emphatically 
that Cuba would declare itself “never to be an enemy of the U.S. 
people.” Five weeks later, following an anthrax attack on the U.S. 
Congress, Cuba offered to deliver to the U.S. government 100 
million tablets of Cipro, an effective antibiotic against anthrax.
On November 12, it offered low cost, Cuban-made devices to 
detect and eliminate anthrax. These measures of support elicited 
little or no acknowledgment from U.S. officials. Most newspapers 
and news broadcasts also overlooked Cuba’s offers of aid and 
concern for U.S. citizens in their time of distress.
When the U.S. government called for an international 
coalition in the struggle against terrorism, the Cuban government 
argued that the struggle should be waged through the United 
Nations (UN). In a letter to UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan, 
President Castro promised Cuba’s complete cooperation with 
initiatives to eliminate terrorism undertaken through multilateral 
institutions. By October 2001, Cuba had ratified twelve UN 
resolutions against terrorism which had stemmed from the 
September 11 attacks.8
Shortly afterward, on November 29, 2001, the chief Cuban 
diplomat in Washington delivered a memorandum to the State 
Department’s Director of the Office of Cuban Affairs, which 
summarized the various Cuban offers of assistance to the United 
States. This gesture was intended to stimulate negotiations on 
three bilateral agreements under which Cuba and the United 
States would have worked collaboratively to deal with issues of 
concern to both: illegal immigration and the smuggling of 
persons, narcotics trafficking, and terrorism. The proposals used 
existing accords with European and Caribbean countries as their 
guideline.
On December 3, 2001, while Cuban and U.S. delegates 
celebrated the signing of a new migration agreement, Ricardo 
Alarcon, president of the Cuba’s National Assembly of People’s 
Power, presented the same three proposals to the U.S. delegation. 
But the U.S. representatives asserted that they had authority only 
to discuss the migration agreement, and that the proposals had to 
be presented through other diplomatic channels. In turn, on 
March 12, 2002, Cuba formally presented three proposals to the 
United States dealing with immigration, the interdiction of drug 
trans-shipments, and the fight against terrorism. The Bush 
administration’s lack of a response indicates that it had no 
interest in discussing the proposed bilateral settlements suggested 
by the Cuban government.
As the war in Afghanistan began, the United States started to 
ship alleged “enemy combatants” to the U.S. Naval Base at 
Guantánamo Bay, which is located on Cuban territory. Though it 
has been under U.S. jurisdiction since the 1898 war for Cuban 
independence, the naval base was effectively isolated after the 
1959 Cuban Revolution. While U.S. possession of the base has 
been a longstanding point of disagreement between the two 
countries, Cuba avoided a confrontation in regard to the use of 
this prison camp. Cuban officials continued to criticize the 
inhumane and illegal detentions, but Cuba’s measured response 
to the unilateral U.S. decision to use Guantánamo Naval Base was 
viewed internationally as a welcome moment of quiet 
collaboration and positive diplomacy between the two countries.
General Raúl Castro Ruz, minister of the Cuban Armed 
Forces, stated on January 19, 2002 that, over the last few years, a 
climate of mutual respect and cooperation surrounding the 
Guantánamo Naval Base has been developed.9 He underscored 
that this minimal contribution was “an example of what could be
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attained in other such areas,” and commented that the new 
environment could aid the fight against drugs and terrorism, 
issues on which Cuba “differed from the U.S. over methods.”10 
The Bush Administration, though, had little interest in 
acknowledging the possibility of an accommodation with Cuba. 
It even ignored the irony of sending prisoners accused of 
terrorism to Cuba’s disputed base at Guantanamo while the 
Department of State considered Cuba to be a state-sponsor of 
terrorism.11
Gate is closed to the maximum security prison at Camp Delta 2 & 3, at the 
Guantanamo Bay U.S. Naval Base, Cuba, April 5, 2006. Photo by Reuters. Courtesy 
of www.chinadaily.com.cn
Indeed, Undersecretary of State John Bolton intensified U.S. 
accusations against Cuba on the eve of former U.S. president 
Jimmy Carter’s May 2002 visit to Cuba. Bolton claimed that Cuba 
had “provided dual-use biotechnology to other rogue states” and 
expressed his concern that this technology would be used to 
“support BW [biological weapons] programs in those states.”12 
His charges were unsubstantiated, and the State Department’s 
own 2002 report on terrorism makes no mention of any Cuban 
biological weapons capability.13 Carter, himself, stated publicly 
that Bush administration officials had repeatedly assured him 
that there was no evidence Cuba had supplied other countries 
with technology for manufacturing weapons of mass 
destruction.14 It appeared that the only reason the Bush 
administration raised the alleged threat of Cuban terrorism at 
that moment was to deflate any possibility that Carter’s trip 
might help to relax tension between the two countries.
The entire affair had become so uncontrolled and 
inflammatory that the Senate Western Hemisphere Affairs 
Subcommittee asked Bolton to explain his lie in testimony. But 
Secretary of State Colin Powell sent Carl Ford, who was head of 
the State Department’s Bureau of Intelligence and Research and 
had a reputation for judiciousness, in Bolton’s place. During the 
June 2002 hearing, Ford repeated what he had said at an earlier 
Senate meeting, that Cuba only has “a limited developmental 
offensive biological warfare research and developmental effort” 
and not a “program”. He added that “it’s not at the top of my 
priority list in terms of the greatest threats posed to the United 
States.”15
Later in 2002, a new unsubstantiated allegation of Cuban 
perfidy arose when Daniel Fisk, Deputy Assistant Secretary of 
State for the Western Hemisphere, charged that Cuban agents
systematically had approached U.S. officials with false warnings 
“about pending terrorist attacks against the United States and 
other Western interests.”16 His claim emerged again in the State 
Department’s Global Terrorism Report: “On repeated occasions, 
for example, Cuba sent agents to US missions around the world 
who provided false leads designed to subvert the post-September
11 investigation.”17
But foreign policy matters concerned President Bush less 
than politics at home as the 2002 election loomed on the 
horizon. In May he returned Cuba policy to the realm of a 
domestic electoral game by announcing a proposed Initiative for 
a New Cuba. The initiative was transparently a sop to the hard 
line Cuban-American community in an attempt to gain its 
support for the 2002 reelection campaign of his brother, Florida 
Governor Jeb Bush, and for Bush’s own 2004 campaign.18 
Promising to veto any new proposal which would expand trade 
relations or would lift restrictions on travel to Cuba by U.S. 
citizens to Cuba, the president bellowed that “Fidel Castro ought 
to open Cuba’s political and economic systems by allowing non- 
Communist candidates to participate in next year’s legislative 
elections and the development of independent trade unions.”19
President Bush’s veto threat also was intended to restrain 
members of Congress who saw their own electoral fortunes tied 
to opening the Cuban market for their districts. Beginning in 
2000, there was increasing pressure from Congress to change U.S. 
policy, and several conservative legislators in the president’s party 
had sponsored measures to relax economic sanctions against 
Cuba. They were the key actors in securing passage of The Trade 
Sanctions Reform and Export Enhancement Act (TRSA) of 2000, 
which was the most far-reaching attenuation of the blockade in 
more than forty years. The TRSA legalized the direct commercial 
export of food and agricultural products from the United States 
to Cuba.
Though the sales required special licensing procedures, and 
the products could be purchased on a cash-only basis or with 
financing obtained through a third country entity, an enormous 
barrier had been breached. From December 2001 to December
2002, U.S. agricultural sales to the island rose to more than $255 
million.20 This placed Cuba in thirtieth place of the 228 
countries which import food and agricultural products from the 
United States, compared with 180th place in 2000 and 138th 
place in 2001.21 By the end of the first quarter of 2004, the 
accumulated U.S. sales to Cuba since late 2001 was $718 
million.22
A majority of both parties, in both chambers of Congress, 
also had voted to allow increased travel to Cuba, even if that 
meant barring the Treasury Department from enforcing the law. 
But unresolved differences in House and Senate versions, and a 
legislative sleight of hand by Majority Leader Tom DeLay (Texas) 
in one instance, kept these proposals from final passage. President 
Bush evidently was not disposed to listen to the increasingly 
bipartisan clamor on Capitol Hill which favored the lifting of 
sanctions against Cuba. Instead, the White House hardened its 
animosity toward Cuba by resorting to rationales which were 
increasingly implausible.
RELATIONS BETWEEN CUBA AND THE 
UNITED STATES AFTER THE U.S. 
INVASION OF IRAQ
The U.S. invasion of Afghanistan, its quick defeat of Iraq’s armed 
forces, and the subsequent occupation of Iraq, displayed the brute 
force and technological wizardry of the U.S. military which
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" T h e  i n v a s i o n  o f  I ra q  e s t a b l i s h e s  a  
c l e a r  w a r n i n g  t o  C u b a  t h a t  t h e  
U n i t e d  S t a t e s  h a s  m o v e d  t o  t h e  
u l t i m a t e  e x t r e m e  In i ts  r a n g e  o f  
o p t i o n s  a g a i n s t  a n y  g o v e r n m e n t  it 
u n i la te r a l ly  d e f i n e s  a s  a n  ‘e n e m y ’... 
D e e m e d  a  r o g u e  s t a t e ,  C u b a  f i n d s
i ts e lf  o n  f iv e  b l a c k  l i s t s  w h i c h  t h e  
U n i t e d  S t a t es  c r e a t e d  u n i l a t e r ally 
t o  r e i n f o r c e  i ts  r h e t o r i c  a n d  
p r o p a g a n d a ,  a n d  t o  p r o v i d e  a n  
a p p a r e n t  j u s t i f i c a t i o n  f o r  a n  
a g g r e s s i v e  p o l i c y  o f  r e g i m e  
c h a n g e . »
undergirded U.S. power. In the process of these interventions, 
force was reborn as the instrument of power which the United 
States was willing to use against those states it unilaterally 
characterized as “rogue”. U.S. officials claim that threats from 
non-state actors—supported by rogue states—legitimate U.S. 
aggression, in order to stop emerging threats before they 
materialize. Asserting that such preventive attacks by the United 
States are in fact “pre-emptive” strikes, the Bush Administration 
has sought to legalize its crude seizure of territory for geo- 
economic and geo-political gains in terms of a hegemonic 
power’s moral need to bring 
about “regime change” when 
the international system is 
threatened.
This overbearing 
philosophy, increases the 
potential for a rapid and lethal 
show of power. With its origins 
in neo-conservative precepts 
about the necessity of 
demonstrating rapid and lethal 
power, the unscrupulous use of 
pretexts such as the alleged 
threat which the Iraqi regime 
posed for U.S. security under 
the presumption that it held 
an arsenal of WMDs, 
illustrates how the Bush 
Administration camouflaged 
the core doctrine of “regime 
change” within the global war 
on terrorism. Such a posture 
allows little space for positive 
dialogue between Cuba and the United States.
The designated “rogue states,” just like those considered part 
of the “Axis of Evil” (Iraq, Iran, North Korea) and “Beyond the 
Axis of Evil” (Cuba, Syria, Libya), were together with Sudan states 
which the State Department deemed as state sponsors of 
terrorism. (Libya was recently removed from the list.) They are all 
are part of the South, which is a different variable in U.S. strategic 
thought, above all if we compare it to the Cold War period when 
an East-West axis was the main reference point.
Following the war in Iraq, the gravest consequence for Cuba 
would result from the U.S. government’s projection of a new 
aggressive and expansionist discourse, if it were willing to put it 
into practice. The invasion of Iraq establishes a clear warning to 
Cuba that the United States has moved to the ultimate extreme in 
its range of options against any government it unilaterally defines 
as an “enemy”. The United States now operates at the fringes of 
international law, defying the UN and its Security Council, and 
there is no force capable of stopping it. Using the war on 
terrorism unilaterally to achieve hidden foreign policy objectives, 
the United States feels it can use or threaten the use of force with 
impunity, even when the country it attacks has no links to 
terrorism.
Deemed a rogue state, Cuba finds itself on five black lists 
which the United States created unilaterally to reinforce its 
rhetoric and propaganda, and to provide an apparent justification 
for an aggressive policy of regime change. Cuba is on the 
following official lists:
■ Countries which possess “at least a limited, developmental 
biological weapons research and development effort.”23
■ State sponsors of international terrorism.24
■ Flagrant human rights violators.25
■ Countries with aggressive intelligence operations on U.S. 
territory.26
■ States trafficking in persons for sexual exploitation and 
forced labor (Victims of Trafficking and Violence 
Protection Act).27 Cuba was included in this group for the 
first time in June 2003.
Moreover, the National Intelligence Council and the CIA 
have identified 25 allegedly unstable countries—one of which is 
Cuba—where U.S. intervention might be required.28 Cuba also is
characterized as an “outpost of 
tyranny,”29 which makes it an 
opportune target under the terms 
of the Bush doctrine. The U.S. 
president declared in his second 
inaugural address that “it is the 
policy of the United States to seek 
and support the growth of 
democratic movements and 
institutions in every nation and 
culture, with the ultimate goal of 
ending tyranny in our world” and 
set the idea that “The future of 
America and the security of 
America depends on the spread of 
liberty”.30
Cuba’s fabricated return to 
the U.S. security circle, and the 
attempts to erode any succession 
plans on the island and to hasten 
the end of the Cuban regime, are 
the cornerstones of U.S. policy 
towards Cuba. The Bush 
Administration defines “regime change” as the basis for 
expanding its global hegemony, unilaterally employing a series of 
public instruments and resources that leave little space for 
positive dialogue with Cuba, even with respect to vital issues.
T H E  F IR S T  R E P O R T  O F  T H E  S O  C A L L E D  
“ C O M M I S S IO N  F O R  A S S IS T A N C E  T O  A  
F R E E  C U B A ”
October 10 is the anniversary of the beginning of the Cuban War 
of Independence against Spain. President Bush pointedly used 
that day in 2003 to announce the formation of a “Commission 
for Assistance to a Free Cuba” (CAFC). Headed jointly by 
Secretary of State Colin Powell and Secretary of Housing and 
Urban Development Mel Martinez, who subsequently became a 
U.S. Senator from Florida and chair of the Republican National 
Committee, CAFC was given the charge to present proposals 
designed to hasten and plan for the “transition to democracy” in 
Cuba. President Bush accepted the Commission’s report (CAFC 
I) on May 6, 2004, in the midst of the presidential electoral 
campaign.31
At first the proposed sanctions were construed as a mere 
attempt to secure the Cuban American vote in southern Florida 
in 2004 presidential elections. In fact the commission’s key 
recommendations were quickly transformed into federal 
regulations, suggesting that the report was not merely an offering 
to right wing Cuban-Americans. It clearly indicates both U.S. 
imperialist aims and the U.S. intention to change the political and 
socioeconomic regime in Cuba in such a way that the clash over 
Cuban sovereignty vs. U.S. domination would be settled in favor
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of domination.32 It envisions not only the kind of government 
the United States would be willing to tolerate—as already 
indicated by the 1996 Helms-Burton Law—but also the 
detailed workings of the “future Cuba”.
Reminiscent of halcyon days in the early twentieth century 
when U.S. proconsul governors John R. Brooke, Leonard 
Wood, and Charles A. Magoon ruled Cuba, the report 
recommends that implementation of its proposed 
transformations would be directed by a State Department 
representative who would oversee an interim government. It 
also calls for a “Transition Coordinator at the State 
Department to facilitate expanded implementation of pro­
democracy, civil-society building, and public diplomacy 
projects for Cuba,”33 as well as the creation of a U.S.-Cuba 
Joint Committee on Trade and Investment (JCTI),34 through 
which the Departments of State, Treasury, Commerce, USAID, 
Justice, Agriculture, Housing and Urban Development would 
make basic decisions about the Cuban economy, including 
implementation of a required Free Trade Agreement (FTA) 
between Washington and Havana.35
Such arrangements constitute an attempt to project not 
only the type of government which the United States would 
tolerate as referenced by the Helms-Burton Act of 1996, but 
also the detailed functioning of Cuba’s future. This is even 
more arrogant than the Platt Amendment, and represents an 
irrational revival of the Monroe Doctrine and Roosevelt 
Corollary.
In order to hasten regime change, the report advocates 
reducing contact between Cubans and their U.S. relatives—as 
well as between Cubans and U.S. citizens in general—by re­
defining “close relatives” narrowly, and by dramatically 
restricting the frequency, length and allowable cost of Cuban 
American family visits to the island.36 Other recommendations 
include sharply reducing allowable remittances and gift parcels 
of household items and medicines; scaling back educational 
travel; and eliminating the category of fully hosted travel.37 
The Treasury Department’s Office of Foreign Assets Control 
(OFAC) published the regulations which emerged from the 
Commission’s proposals on June 16, 2004, and they became 
effective on June 30, 2004.38
Though Larry Wilkerson, chief of staff to Colin Powell, 
called the Commission’s plans “the dumbest policy on the face 
of the earth,”39 Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice followed 
them in 2005 by appointing an obscure former employee of 
the House International Relations Committee, Caleb McCarry, 
as Cuba transition coordinator. The appointment indicated 
that the cornerstones of the Administration’s strategy include 
redefining Cuba as a security threat to the United States, 
preventing Cuba from developing its own transition plans, and 
accelerating the end of the current Cuban regime.
Consequently, any kind of Cuban-U.S. interaction—whether 
educational, religious, humanitarian, or commercial—which 
could lead to mutual understanding, would challenge the Bush 
Administration’s goals for Cuba.
The Cuba transition coordinator and the Department of 
State’s Office of Reconstruction and Stabilization have warned 
that a Cuban transition might be attended by violence, in 
which case the United States would have to undertake a project 
of nation building.41 At the same time, a U.S. invasion of 
Cuba, once the “transition genie is out of the bottle,” has not 
been rejected.42 This hostile posture was reinforced in 
December 2005 when Secretary of State Rice stated that it “was 
time” for a regime change in Cuba after 46 years of Fidel
Castro’s “cruel dictatorship” and announced that Washington 
would take new measures to hasten the end of the “oppression”. 
The Bush administration’s use of “transformational 
diplomacy” and forcible democratization in dealing with Cuba 
was under way.
C A F C  I I  A N D  C U B A N  L E A D E R  F ID E L  
C A S T R O ’S JU L Y  31 S U R P R IS E
Rice and Cuban-American Commerce Secretary Carlos 
Gutierrez replaced Colin Powell and Mel Martinez, respectively, 
as co-chairs of CAFC. On July 10, 2006 they ceremoniously 
released the Commission’s second report (CAFC II). Joined by 
the Cuba transition coordinator, Caleb McCarry, they claimed 
success for the 2004 measures, and they offered additional 
recommendations to insure that "the Castro regime's 
succession strategy does not succeed." The hollowness of their 
claims was revealed in a November 15, 2006 audit released by 
the General Accountability Office (GAO), the investigative arm 
of U.S. Congress, released on its audit on how well USAID's 
Cuba program is working. The GAO study found lax oversight 
of USAID's programs and "questionable expenditures" which 
had resulted in most of the $65 million and the $8 million 
earmarked for Cuba democracy assistance programs by USAID 
and the State Department, respectively, remained in Miami or 
Washington.45 The programs, the GAO concluded, had done 
little more than create an anti-Castro economy which financed 
activities in the United States -  including what some analysts 
saw as electoral support from the Cuban American 
community.46
CAFC II offers detailed plans for a U.S. occupation, from 
reorganizing the economy and the educational system to the 
holding of multiparty elections. Though the report’s 
recommendations seemed to be the stuff of fantasy, Cuban 
officials could not dismiss them easily, because their 
publication coincided with organizational changes that 
effectively institutionalized U.S. policy towards Cuba. During 
the summer and fall of 2006, the Bush administration created 
six interagency working groups to monitor Cuba and to use 
increased funding to implement U.S. policies more vigorously 
in order to bring about “ Cuban regime change”. Three of the 
newly created groups—for diplomatic actions, strategic 
communications, and democracy promotion—are located in 
the State Department.47 A fourth, which coordinates 
humanitarian aid to Cuba, is run by the Commerce 
Department. The National Security Council and the 
Department of Homeland Security are in charge of an 
interagency working group which focuses on migration 
issues.48 The sixth group, is chaired by the U.S. Attorney for 
the Southern District of Florida, and is comprised of members 
from OFAC, ICE, FBI, IRS, the Department of Commerce’s 
Office of Export Enforcement, the U.S. Coast Guard, and the 
Field and Air divisions of Customs and Border Protection.49 
Named the “Cuban Sanctions Enforcement Task Force,” it was 
formed to investigate violations and enforce energetically 
existing U.S. economic sanctions against Cuba.
At about the same time, the intelligence community 
restructured the way it monitored Cuba. In August 2006 
Director of National Intelligence John Negroponte appointed 
CIA veteran Patrick Maher to be acting mission manager for a 
new unit which combined and coordinated two separate 
departments devoted to Cuba and Venezuela.50 The 
significance of these administrative changes is that
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organizational units can take on a life of their own, especially as 
professionals gain a vested interest in their new responsibilities. 
These actions thus contribute to the maintenance of a hostile 
policy.
The most concrete recommendation in CAFC II was the 
creation of an $80 million fund—to be known as the Cuba Fund 
for a Democratic Future—to “promote democracy” in Cuba. The 
report called for at least $20 million be added to the program 
every year after the initial two-year period, in addition to the $10 
million a year which the State Department and the U.S. Agency 
for International Development (USAID) spend for other 
democracy-assistance programs.51 Moreover, CAFC II proposes a 
broad array of measures to tighten the enforcement of U.S. 
sanctions against the island, from creating another task force to 
target Cuba's growing nickel exports, to stopping humanitarian 
aid from reaching organizations with alleged links to the
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government, such as the Cuban Council of Churches.52 The 
report also advocated amending Presidential Proclamation 5377 
“to permit the denial of immigrant, as well as non-immigrant 
visas, to officers and employees of the Government of Cuba or 
the Communist Party of Cuba.”53 A portion of the report— 
included in a secret annex—remains hidden from public scrutiny 
for "reasons of national security".54
Supporters of the Bush Administration’s strategy for dealing with 
Cuba -  i.e., “transformational diplomacy” and forcible 
democratization -  saw the timing of CAFC II as remarkably 
prescient. Only 21 days after it was published, on July 31, 2006, 
the Cuban government announced that its ailing leader, Fidel 
Castro, had provisionally ceded power to a collective leadership 
headed by Raul Castro. The possibility of a transition in Cuba 
instantly became palpable. But U.S prognosticators had not 
anticipated the scenario which unfolded, in which the Cuban 
leader stayed in the background while a group of seasoned 
policymakers coordinated the continuity of the Cuban Project.
Though the Cuban system showed no instability in the wake 
of President Castro’s illness, the turn of events did force 
Washington to consider the real consequences of its policy. The 
question arose as to whether continuation of punishment of 
Cuba served U.S. interests. The Department of Defense, for
example, had balked at acting too aggressively for fear of igniting 
a crisis in the U.S. backyard at a time when U.S. forces already 
were stretched thin by the Afghan and Iraq wars. And if 
rumblings of instability did begin to emerge from Cuba, it was 
hardly clear that Bush’s mindless chants, urging Cubans on the 
island to adopt so-called democratic reforms, offered the United 
States a meaningful guideline to deal with such a circumstance. 
Would the United States try to push the regime over the edge, or 
would it help the regime to survive in order to avert chaos 90 
miles from south Florida?
What was clearer to Cubans, though, was the way in which 
four decades plus of inhumane economic sanctions, and a policy 
of increasing hostility, had undermined U.S. claims for a role in 
shaping whatever might unfold within Cuban domestic politics 
on the island. At the same time, the negative U.S. position in its 
historic conflict with Cuba has engendered a spirit of Cuban 
nationalism, while the Helms-Burton law, which codified the 
sanctions, reduced Washington's options. Helms-Burton 
established the criteria for a post-Fidel Castro government which 
would be acceptable to the United States, and it defined 
conditions Cuba had to meet in order for the United States to lift 
sanctions. For example, if the Cuban people elected Raul Castro 
as their next President, even in a U.S.-style “open” election, the 
law requires the sanctions to remain in place. Such limitations on 
U.S. policy options constitute an enormous problem. Credible 
scenarios leading to chaos and violence can be envisioned if there 
were an upsurge in interest from radical right wing segments in 
the Cuban-American community. These extremists could well 
engage in provocations in order to draw the United States and 
Cuba into a direct conflict.
NOTES FOR REFLECTION
While policy making in Cuba has always taken U.S. politics into 
serious consideration, Cuba has not been, in the short or 
medium term, a political priority for the United States. This fact 
has constrained the debate on U.S. Cuba policy for more than 45 
years. As a consequence, those with narrowly-focused interests 
traditionally monopolized the discussion about Cuba in the 
United States. A reassessment of the Cuban issue, placing it in a 
world context, is imperative for the establishment of constructive 
relations between the two nations.
Globalization, with its contradictory processes of economic 
integration and the marginalization of states, nations, and social 
groups, has made it essential to face genuine and universal 
problems of terrorism, underdevelopment, pollution, migration, 
drug-trafficking, weapons proliferation, and human smuggling, 
as well as new challenges to national, regional, and international 
security. The geographic, economic, political, and cultural space 
that Cuba and the United States share cannot be ignored. 
Therefore, agreement on subjects of common concern is in the 
short-term interest of both countries. For example, the United 
States and Cuba could readily engage in positive-sum 
negotiations over issues related to the environment, terrorism, 
immigration, and drug trafficking.
Negotiations concerning matters covered by international 
laws also could be feasible in the medium term. They might 
address issues such as the property claims and counterclaims of 
the two governments, the status of Guantanamo naval base, and 
the lifting of trade sanctions and restoration of normal trade 
relations. This would open the way for consular and diplomatic 
relations.
But the sine qua non of negotiations for most people on the
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island is that the United States must respect Cubas sovereignty 
and quest for independence. Any U.S. intent to restore 
domination over Cuba would violate a fundamental Cuban 
national interest. U.S. willingness to abandon such a goal would 
be an indication of how seriously Washington sought meaningful 
negotiations and a peaceful outcome to any Cuban transition. To 
be sure, Cuba also must take into account U.S. national interests 
and concerns about regional security. Thus the process by which 
the two neighbors could achieve constructive coexistence needs 
to begin with mutual respect.
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